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408 GUARDIANSHIP OF HUDELSON. [18 C. (2d) 
days subsequent to said ruling, we cannot assume that ap-' 
pellant voluntarily included in this instrument an acknowl-
edgment that the payments might be considered a charge 
against her prospective share of this estate. However, it is 
our opinion that appellant's first proposition is entirely with-
out merit, for the court's written order expressing the inten-
,tion of this donor to create an advancement fully met the 
requirements of section 1050. The incompetent not having 
legal capacity to act for himself, the court acted for him, and 
its order must be taken in lieu of the written expression of 
the incompetent donor of his intention that these monthly 
allowances shall be considered an advancement to appellant. 
This conclusion is in complete accord with the general princi-
ple that the court, acting in equity for the protection of the 
interests of the incompetent and after full consideration of 
the evidence before it, is free to exercise its sound discretion 
with reference to the disposition and management of the es-
tate. 
From these premises our decision must be that the court 
had authority to allow these payments from the surplus in-
come of the incompetent on condition that they "shall con-
stitute an advance against any inheritance petitioner might 
receive upon the death of her father." 
The order is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Tray-
nor, J., and Spence, J., pro tem., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied August 
28, 1941. 
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NETTIE L. SEEGER et al., Appellants, v. A. tT. ODELL 
. et al., Respondents. 
[1] Pleading-Motions-For Judginent on Pleadings-Motion as 
Admission.-On appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in' 
favor of the defendant, the allegations of the complaint must 
be considered true as though the complaint were before the 
court upon a general demurrer. 
[2a,2b] Cancellation - Actions - Pleading - Pleading Based on 
Fraud.-A complaint states a cause of action to set aside a, 
foreclosure sale, to rescind, and quiet title in plaintiff as 
against an oil lease in which plaintiff joined, together with 
an accounting of the profits where it alleges plaintiffs' execu-
tion of a note and mortgage on a lot, their reliance, after 
foreclosure of a mortgage by certain defendants, on false 
representations of their attorney as to a previous execution 
sale of his lot to them and his consequent joinder in an oil 
lease, the foreclosure sale of the property to one of the 
defendants, the discovery of the falsity of the representations, 
and excuse for delay in making it. 
[3] Id.-Grounds-Fraud.-A person who has been induced by 
fraudulent misrepresentations to enter into' a contrac,t or to 
make a conveyance may have the contract or conveyance set 
aside and secure a restitution of those benefits lost to him 
by the transaction. (See Civ. Code, § 1689 (1);) 
[4] Fraud-Representations-De:fl.nitions.-A fraudulent misrepre-
sentation is one made with the knowledge that it is or may 
be untrue, and with the intention that the person to whom 
it is made act in reliance thereon. (See Civ. Code, §§ 1572, 
1710.) 
[5] Id.-Reliance on Representation-Necessity.-To be entitled 
to relief from fraud it must appear not only that the plain-
McK. Dig. References: 1. Pleading, § 243 (1); 2. Cancellation 
and Rescission, § 56; 3. Cancellation and Rescission, § 23; 4. Fraud 
and Deceit, § 7; 5. Fraud and Deceit, §§ 22, 23; 6. Fraud and 
Deceit, § 9 (6); 7. Fraud and Deceit, § 26;' 8. Torts, § 7; 9. Fraud 
and Deceit, § 26 (1); 10, 12. Fraud and Deceit, § 27; 11. Fraud 
and Deceit, § 9 (2); 13. Cancellation and Rescission, § 59; 14. 
Cancellation and Rescission, §§ 11, 12, 14; 15. Equity, § 52; 16. 
Cancellation and Rescission, § 16; 17, 18. Cancellation and Rescis-
sion, § 60. 
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tiff acted in reliance on the misrepresentation,but that he 
was justified in his reliance. 
[6] Id. - Representations - Statements of Fact and Opinion-
Qualifications of Rule.-A party may not justifiably rely upon 
mere statements of opinion, including legal conclusions drawn 
from a true state of facts, unless the person expressing the 
opinion purports to have expert knowledge concerning the 
matter or occupies a position of confidence and trust. If, 
however, the opinion or legal conclusion misrepresents the 
facts upon which it is based or implies the existence of facts 
which are nonexistent, it constitutes an actionable misrepre-
sentation. 
[7a,7b] Id.-Reliance on Representation-Duty to Investigate.-
Negligence on the part of the plaintiff in failing to discover 
the falsity of a statement is no defense when the misrepre-
sentation was intentional rather than negligent. The fact 
that an investigation would have revealed the falsity of the 
misrepresentation will not alone bar recovery. 
[8] Torts-Defenses-Negligence.-As a general rule negligence 
of the plaintiff is no defense to an intentional tort. 
[9] Fraud-Reliance on Representation-Duty to Oonsult Records. 
The purpose of the recording acts is to afford protection not 
to those who make fraudulent misrepresentations but to 
bona fide purchasers for value. And the party to whom false 
representations are made is not held to constructive notice 
of a public record which would reveal the true facts. 
[10] Id. - Reliance on Representation - Effect of Knowledge-
Standard of Precaution and Minimum Knowledge.-A plain-
tiff. seeking relief from fraud is not held 'to the standard of 
precaution or of minimum knowledge of a hypothetical, rea-
sonable man. However, if the conduct of the plaintiff in the 
light of his own intelligence and information was manifestly 
unreasonable, he will be denied a recovery. 
[11] Id. - Representations - Statements of Fact and Opinion-
I11ustrations-Execution-Levy and Sale.-A representation 
that a levy of execution and sale of the property had oc-
curred is a false' statement of fact, and' it is not rendered 
less actionable because it also contains legal conclusions. 
[12] Id. - Reliance on Representation - Effect of Knowledge-
Owner's Title.-An owner of property is not conclusively 
presumed to know the state of his own title, and is not 
therefore precluded from relying upon misrepresentations as 
to ownership. While situations might arise where the owner 
would not be justified in relying upon such a misrepresenta-
6. See 12 Oal. Jur. 725 et seq.; 23 Am. Jur. 781. 
9. See 12 Oal. Jur. 759, 761, 764; 23 Am. Jur. 972. 
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tion, the circumstances of each case should determine whether 
or not justification exists as in any other action based upon 
fraud. (Robins v. Hope) 57 Cal. 493, overruled.) 
[13] Oancellation-Actions-Pleading-Pleading Based on Fraud 
-Damage.-In an action to set aside a foreclosure sale and to 
rescind an oil lease on the ground of fraudulent misrepresenta-
tions, it is sufficient for the plaintiffs to allege that they 
have been wrongfully deprived of certain property by reason 
of the misrepresentations. They need not set forth in de-
tuil the extent to which they have been damaged. 
[14] Id.-Oonditions Precedent-Restitution-Application of and 
Limitation on Rule;-Plaintiffs seeking to set aside a fore-
closure sale and to rescind an oil lease upon the ground of 
fraud must restore to the defendants any benefits which they 
have received as a result of the transaction. They must, 
therefore, pay to the mortgagee the amount of the mortgage 
debt before they can recover the property. But since oil 
royalties received by the plaintiffs are rightfully theirs, a 
restoration thereof is not necessary.. 
[15] Equity-Pleading and Practice-Decree.-A court granting 
equitable relief has the power to make its decrees contingent 
upon compliance by the plaintiff with certain conditions. 
[16] Oancellation-Oonditions Precedent-Restitution-Sufficiency 
of Offer.-There is a sufficient offer of restitution where the 
plaintiffs in their complaint offer to "do and perform all 
things of them in equity required by the court to be done by 
them in the premises" and to subtract the amount of the 
mortgage debt from any sum awarded them from defend-
ants. 
[17] Id.-Actions-Pleading-Pleading Based on Fraud~Avoid­
ance of Laches.-A plaintiff seeking relief on the ground of 
fraud more than three years after the misrepresentation· must 
allege facts showing that suit was brought within a reasonable 
time after discovery of the fraud and without unnecessary 
delay and that failure to make the discovery sooner was 
not due to negligence. . 
[18] Id.-Actions-Pleading---:Pleading Based on Fraud-Avoid-
ance of Laches-Application of Rule.-A complaint to set 
aside a foreclosure sale and to rescind an oil lease brought 
more than three years after the misrepresentations sufficiently 
excuses delay where it alleges that the discovery did not occur 
sooner because of plaintiffs' advanced age, the considerable 
distance of the available records from their home, and the ab-
sence of any occasion on their part to examine the records 
or otherwise inquire into the truth of the representations. 
14. See 4 Oal. Jur. 767; 120al. Jur. 781; 9 Am.. Jur. 385. 
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
Orange County. Franklin G. West, Judge. Reversed. 
Action to have a mortgage foreclosure sale set aside, to 
rescind an oil lease, to quiet title to land in the plaintiffs 
except as to certain subleases, and for moneys received by 
plaintiffs' co lessor for oil royalties and by an o.il lessee fro.m 
an oil well. Judgment on the pleadings for the defendants, 
reversed. 
Daniel A. Knapp and Fred A. Wilbur fo.r Appellants. 
Louis N. Whealton, Wm. H. Neblett, B. H. Neblett and 
E. Walter Guthrie for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-[l] Plaintiffs have appealed from a 
judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendants A. J. 
Odell, Mary Gibbs, William G. McAdoo and R.T. Colter. 
The allegations o.f the complaint must therefore be consid-
ered true as tho.ugh the complaint were before the court upon 
a general demurrer. (Miller v. Price, 103 Cal App. 650, 
654 [284 Pac. 1035].) 
[2a] The complaint alleges: The plaintiffs, an elderly 
couple, were the owners of a lot located in Huntington Beach, 
California. In 1926 they executed a note and mortgage on 
this lot to William G. McAdoo and R. T. Colter as security 
for the payment of a loan of $2255. McAdoo and Colter 
assigned the note and mo.rtgage to Mary Gibbs who in 1933 
secured a final judgment of foreclosure. Shortly thereafter, 
A. J. Odell and Mary Gibbs requested the plaintiffs to confer 
with them on the disposition of the property. At the con-
ference McAdoo, Colter, Gibbs and Odell were represented 
by their attorney, Ben H. Neblett. Neblett told plaintiffs 
that as an attorney he had superio.r knowledge of many facts 
concerning the land and that they could rely upon all he 
had to say. l\1:cAdoo and Colter had previously secured a 
money judgment against plaintiffs in another action, and 
Neblett stated that, acting on behalf of Colter and McAdoo, 
he had secured an execution on plaintiffs' land to satisfy the 
judgment, that the sheriff had levied o.n the land and sold 
it to' McAdoo and Colter for the amount of the judgment 
debt, and that McAdoo and Colter were the owners of any 
Aug. 1941.] SEEGER V. ODELL. 
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interest which plaintiffs previously had in the land. McAdoo 
and Colter, he represented, were going to submit to the fore-
closure sale, which had been set for August, 1933, and would 
not exercise their equity of redemption. Neblett went on to 
assure the plaintiffs, however, that he and his clients were 
plaintiffs' friends and would make an unselfish proposal 
solely to enable the plaintiffs to receive some return .from 
the land out o.f which they would otherwise get nothing. 
The proposal was that plaintiffs join with Mary Gibbs in a 
leMe of the land to Odell for the purpose of drilling for oil, 
with the understanding that they would receive a specific 
royalty fro.m the oil produced. 
The complaint further alleges: The plaintiffs believedNeb-
lett's representation that their land had been sold at an 
execution sale to Colter and McAdoo. They therefore joined 
in executing a lease to Odell and made no attempt to. pay the 
mo.rtgage debt or to exercise the equity of redemption after 
the foreclosure sale although during this period many per-
sons offered to lease the land from them with advances suffi-
cient to· cover the mortgage indebtedness. After Mary Gibbs 
bought in the property at the foreclosure sale in August, 
1933, Odell took possession under his lease and· drilled a 
well from which he has received profits of more than $100,000. 
The complaint alleges ·,;Eurther: No execution actually had 
been levied o.n the 'land: The representation that the land 
had been sold to McAdoo and Colter was known to be false 
by Neblett and his clients. It was made to induce the plain-
tiffs to refrain from paying the mortgage indebtedness or 
from exercising their equity of redemptio.n and to induce 
them to join in leasing the property to Odell. Plaintiffs did 
not discover the falsity of the representatio.ns until May, 1936. 
The records co.vering the facts involved were situated in a 
city at some distance from the city where plaintiffs reside. 
They are both elderly; neither drives an automobile, and 
they had no reason to suspect that the representations were 
false. Following the discovery of the misrepresentation, 
plaintiffs no.tified Odell of their rescission of the lease. They 
then brought this action against Odell, McAdoo, Colter, and 
Gibbs asking that the foreclosure sale to Mary Gibbs be set 
aside, that the title to the property be quieted in them except 
as to existent subleases in the hands of innocent sublessees, 
414 SEEGER V. ODELL. [18 C. (2d) 
and that a judgment be awarded them for all moneys received 
as royalties by Mary Gibbs or her assigns from the oil well 
and for all moneys received by Odell from the oil well. 
Plaintiffs -offer to do all things required of them by the court 
including the paying of the mortgage indebtedness on the 
property. The oil companies were made nominal defend-
ants solely to have their rights, if any, adjudicated. 
[3] It is well established in California and other jurisdic-
tions that a person who has been induced by fraudulent mis-
representations to enter into a contract or to make a convey-
ance may have the contract or conveyance set aside and secure 
a restitution of those benefits lost to him by the transaction. 
(Cal. Civ. Code, sec. 1689 (1); see cases cited in 12 Cal. Jur. 
781, 782; 6 Cal. Jur. Supp. 54; Cal. A.nnotations to Rest. 
Restitution, sec. 28. See Rest. Restitution, sec. 28.) [4] 
A fraudulent misrepresentation is one made with the knowl-
edge that it is or may be untrue, and with the intention that 
the person to whom it is made act in reliance thereon. (Rest. 
Torts, secs. 526, 531; Cal. Civ. Code, secs. 1572, 1710; see 
cases cited in 12 Cal. Jur. 706-709. [5] It must appear, 
however, not only that the plaintiff acted in reliance on the 
misrepresentation but that he was justified in his reliance. 
(Rest. Torts, sec. 537; see cases cited in 12 Cal. Jur. 750 
et seq.) [6] He may not justifiably rely upon mere state-
ments of opillion, including legal cQnclusions drawn from a 
true state of facts (Rest. Torts, sec. 545; see cases cited in 
12 Cal. Jur. 730-733, unless the person expressing the 
opinion purports to have expert knowledge concerning the 
l\Ilatter or occupies a position of confidence and trust. (Rest., 
Torts, sec. 542; see cases cited in 12 Cal. Jur. 725 et seq.) 
If, however, the opinion or legal conclusion misrepresents 
the facts upon which it is based or implies the existence of 
facts which are nonexistent, it constitutes an actionable mis-
representation. (Rest. Torts, sec. 539; see cases cited in 
12 Cal. Jur. 727, 728.) [7a] Negligence on the part of the 
plaintiff in failing to discover the falsity of a statement is 
no defense when the misrepresentation was intentional rather 
than negligent. (See cases cited in 12 Cal. Jur. 758, 759; 
Prosser, Torts, 748.) [8] As a general rule negligence of 
the plaintiff is no defense to an intentional tort. (See Pros-
ser, Torts, 402.) [7b,9] The fact that an investigation 
would have revealed the falsity of the misrepresentation will 
Aug. 1941.] SEEGER V. ODELL. 
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not alone bar his recovery (Rest. Torts, sec. 540; see cases 
cited in 12 Cal. Jur. 758, 759), and it is well established that 
he is not-held to constructive notice of a public record which 
would reveal the true facts. (Rest. Torts, sec. 540 (b); see 
cases cited in 12 Cal. Jur. 759, 764; Prosser, Torts, 750, 751.) 
The purpose of the recording acts is to' afford protection not 
to those who make fraudulent misrepresentations but to bona 
ji'de purchasers for value. [10] Nor is a plaintiff held to 
the standard of precaution or of minimum knowledge of a 
hypothetical, reasonable man. Exceptionally gullible or ig-
norant people have been permitted to recover from defend-
ants who took advantage of them in circumstances where 
persons of normal intelligence would not have been misled. 
(See cases cited in 6 Cal. Jur. Supp. 45 (note 13) ; Prosser, 
Torts, 749.) "No rogue should enjoy his ill-gotten plunder 
for the simple reason that his victim is by chance a fooL" 
(Chamberlin v. Fuller, 59 Vt. 247 [9 Atl. 832, 835].) If the 
conduct of the plaintiff in the light of his own intelligence 
and information was manifestly unreasonable, however, he 
will be denied a recovery. (Rest. Torts, sec. 541; see cases 
cited in 12 Cal. Jur. 757; Prosser, Torts, 747, 748.) "He 
may not put faith in representations which are preposterous, 
or which are shown by facts within his observation to be so 
patently and obviously false that he must have closed his eyes 
to avoid discovery of the truth .... " (Prosser, Torts, 749.) 
[2b] In the present case the allegations of the plaintiffs' 
complaint, if true, are sufficient to establish the right to re-
lief on the basis of a fraudulent misrepresentation. Accord-
ing to these allegations the misrepresentation was ma.de by 
the defendants through their agent (see cases cited in 12 
Cal. Jur. 774; 6 Cal. Jur. Supp. 51) with the knowledge that 
it was false and with the intention of inducing plaintiffs to 
act in reliance upon it, and plaintiffs did act in reliance 
thereon. The fact that an examination of the record would 
have revealed to plaintiffs the falsity of the representation 
or that they may have been negligent in failing to make 
further investigations does not bar their right to relief. The 
misrepresentation is not such that its falsity must have been 
so obvious to _ the plaintiffs as to preclude any justifiable re-
liance thereon by them. The defendants cannot -urge as a 
defense that plaintiffs were more credulous than the average 
416 SEEGER V. ODELL. [18 C. (2d) 
person. [11] The representation that a levy of execution 
and sale of the property had occurred was a false statement 
of fact and is not rendered less actionable because it also 
contained legal conclusions. 
[12] Defendants contend that under the case of Robins 
v. 11 ope, 57 Cal. 493, an owner of property in California is 
"conclusively presumed" to know the state of his own title 
and therefore may not justifiably rely upon misrepresenta-
tions as to ownership. Since a "conclusive presumption" is 
simply a statement of the rule of law applicable in a given 
situation, defendants are contending for the establishment of 
a rule that no action will lie for a fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion when it concerns the title to property owned by the party 
misled. Such a rule would give legal sanction to the per-
petration of fraud and permit the cunning to take unfair 
advantage of the ignorant. The average property owner 
knows nothing more about the state of his own title than that 
it is presumably in himself. He usually purchases his prop-
erty in reliance upon a policy of title insurance and does 
not search the record for possible adverse claims. While 
situations might arise where the owner of property would 
not be jUstified in relying upon a misrepresentation as to its 
title, the circumstances of each case should determine whether 
or not justification exists as in any other action based upon 
fraud. The defense should not be conclusively presumed 
against the owner without giving him a chance to show jus-
tifiable reliance. Numerous cases in other jurisdictions have 
permitted a vendor of realty to rescind a contract of sale 
because the vendee had fraudulently misrepresented to the 
vendor the value, quantity, or state of the title of the land 
being conveyed. No attempt is made to presume, conclusively 
or otherwise, knowledge by the ignorant vendor of the facts 
concerning his m·Vn land. (Holt v. Gordon, (Tex. Civ. App.) 
176 S. W. 902; Livingston v. Peru Iron 00., (N. Y.) 2 Paige, 
390; Caples v. Steel, 7 Ore. 491; Crompton v. Beedle, 83 Vt. 
287 [75 Atl. 331, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 399, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 
748] ; Burrows v. Fitch, 62 W. Va. 116 [57 S. E. 283] ; Wilson 
v. NichOlls, 72 Conn. 173 [43 Atl. 1052] ; Faxon v. Baldwin, 
136 Iowa 519 [114 N. W. 401. See 9 A. L. R. 1062; 30 
L. R. A. (N. S.) 753.) In the California case of Oonlan v. 
Sullivan, 110 Cal. 624 [42 Pac. 1081], a vendee purchased 
land from a vendor for far less than its value by concealing 
Aug. 1941.] SEEGER v. ODELL. 
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'from the vendor the fact that a mortgage with which the 
vendor believed the land to be encumbered actually applied 
to another piece of land. This court held that the fraudulent 
'conduct of the vendee justified the trial court in rescinding 
the contract of sale on behalf of the vendor. There was no 
conclusive presumption against the vendor that he knew the 
state of the title to his land. In the recent case of Glickman 
v. N,ew York liife Insurance 00., 16 Cal. (2d) 626 [107 Pac. 
(2d) 252, 131 A. L. R. 1292], this court held that the holder 
of an insurance policy was not so chargeable with notice of 
the terms of his policy as to be precluded from rescinding a 
surrender of the policy when he was misled by fraudulent 
statements as to his rights made by the insurer's agent. The 
same considerations that prompted the court to refuse to 
hold the policyholder to a knowledge of the terms of his 
policy apply' against conclusively presuming knowledge of 
the state of his title on the part of the owner of realty. The 
case of Robins v. Hope is therefore overruled to the extent 
that it holds that an owner of realty is conclusively presumed 
to know the state of the title to his land. 
[13] Because of the alleged fraudulent misrepresentation 
:plaintiffs ask for a setting aside of the foreclosure sale to 
Mary Gibbs and a rescission of the lease to Odell with an 
accounting of the profits received by these defendants from 
the property. Since the action is one for equitable relief, 
rather than for damages at law, it is sufficient for the plain-
tiffs to allege that they have been wrongfully deprived ot 
certain property by the misrepresentation and they need not 
set forth in detail the extent to which they have been dam-
aged. (See cases cited in 12 Cal. Jur. 813, 814.) [14] As 
a condition of restitution, however, the plaintiffs must restore 
to the defendants any benefits that they have received as a 
result of the transaction. (Rest. Restitution, sec. 65; Civ. 
Code, sec. 1691 (2); see cases cited in Cal. Annotations to 
Rest. Restitution, sec. 65 ;12 Cal. Jur. 781.) Plaintiffs must 
therefore pay to Mary Gibbs the amount of the mortgage debt 
before they can recover the property. .A restoration of the 
royalties received by plaintiffs is not necessary since they need 
not restore property which is rightfully theirs. (See Rest. 
Restitution, sec. 65, and Cal. Annotations.) [15] Defend-
ants contend that plaintiffs have not properly offered to 
make the necessary restitution. It is well established., how-
18 C. (2d)-14 
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ever, that a court granting equitable relief has the power to 
make its decrees contingent upon compliance by the plain-
tiff with certain conditions. ' (See cases cited in 10 Cal. Jur. 
508-511, 512.) [16] The interests of the defendants can 
thus be well protected by a decree'making any relief granted, 
to plaintiffs conditional upon their paying the mortgage debt. 
Plaintiffs' offer in their complaint to "do 'and perform all 
things of them in equity required by the court to be done by 
them in the premises" and to subtract the amount' of the 
mortgage debt from any sum awarded them from Mary Gibbs 
is a sufficient offer of restitution. 
[17] Defendants finally contend that plaintiffs are barred 
from a recovery by the statute of limitations and laches. In 
California the statute of limitations in an action based upon 
fraud begins to run from th.e time when the fraud was dis-
covered or should reasonably have been discovered. (Code 
Civ. Proc., sec. 338 (4).) It is necessary for a plaintiff 
to allege facts showing that suit was brought within a rea-
sonable time after discovery of the fraud without unneces-
sary delay and that failure to make the discovery sooner 
was not due to negligence. (See cases cited in 12 Cal. Jur. 
795-799.) [18] The present action was brought more than 
three years after the date when the misrepresentation was 
allegedly made but only sixty days after it was discovered. 
Plaintiffs allege that the discovery did not occur sooner be-
cause of their advanced age, the considerable distance of the 
available records from their home, and the absence of any 
occasion on their part to examine the 'records or otherwise 
inquire into the truth of the representation. The alleged 
facts, if believed, would justify a trial court in finding that 
the plaintiffs were sufficiently diligent in discovering the 
fraud and that the action was brought within a reasonable 
time thereafter. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J.,Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Houser, J., 
and Carter, J., concurred. 
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LOEW'S INCORPORATED (a Corporation) et al., Peti-
tioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS AN-
G ELES COUNTY, Respondent. 
[1] Literary Property-Right of First Publication-Publication as 
Dedication.-Apart from statute, an author of an intellectual 
production has a right of first publication, which is' trans-
ferable, and which is entitled to the same protection as rights 
in other species of property. But publication by the author 
is a dedication to the public, which terminates the author's 
exclusive right of property in the work. 
[2] Copyright-Nature and Extent of Rights-Notice by Com-
pliance With Statute.-In case of a literary work, there is 
no right which can be protected under the,copyright law until 
first pUblication. Upon first publication the right of exclu-
sive property, that is, the right to multiply copies for a 
limited period, is that afforded by the statute,whereas in 
the case of an unpublished dramaticcomposition the statutory 
right to exclusive performance or representation exists for 
a limited period. Compliance with the statute to secure ex-
elusive performance serves as constructive notice of the ex-
elusive right and affords prima facie evidence of the facts 
stated in the certificate of registration, and, therefore, of the 
originality and innocence of the composition. 
[3] Id.-Nonconcurrence of Statutory and Common-Law Rights-,-
Exclusiveness of Statutory Remedy.-The author of a dram,atic 
composition who by compliance with the copyright law (17 
U. S. C. A., § 11), has become the owner of a special statu-
tory right, that is, the right to exclusive representation of 
the composition for profit, is restricted to the statutory 
remedies. The common-law right of exclusive representation 
of an unpublished dramatic work exists until the statute 
has been invoked and rights created thereunder, or it has 
otherwise been abandoned. The common law and statutory 
rights may not exist concurrently and an 'author who elects 
to secure protection under the statute may not afterwards 
make a different election. 
[4] Id.-""::Infringement-Jurisdiction.-The superior court' is with-
out jurisdiction over an action for damages for misappro-, 
priation of a copyrighted dramatic publication predicated on 
4. See 34 Am. Jur. 481. 
McK. Dig. References: 1. Literary Property; 2-4. Copyright. 
